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Abstract:  
This  paper  sets  forth  a  Neo-Kaleckian  model  of  capacity  utilization  and  growth  with  distribution 
featuring a profit-sharing arrangement. While a given proportion of firms compensate workers with only 
a base wage, the remaining proportion do so with a base wage and a share of profits. Consistent with the 
empirical  evidence,  workers  hired  by  profit-sharing  firms  have  a  higher  productivity  than  their 
counterparts in base-wage firms. While a higher profit-sharing coefficient raises capacity utilization and 
growth irrespective of the distribution of compensation strategies across firms, a higher frequency of 
profit-sharing firms does likewise only if the profit-sharing coefficient is sufficiently high.  
 
A Neo-Kaleckian Model of Profit Sharing, Capacity Utilization and Economic 
Growth
1 




Weitzman’s (1984, 1985) contention that profit sharing is able to bring about 
full employment and low inflation has not led to its extensive use, yet alternative 
employee  compensation  mechanisms  have  become  more  common  since  the 
1980s (D’Art and Turner, 2004; Dube and Freeman, 2008). Weitzman claimed that 
while a wage economy is prone to unemployment in the short run, a profit-sharing 
economy rather experiences excess demand for labor. The reason is that, if some 
part of workers’ total compensation is received as a profit share and if, as a result, 
the base wage is lower than otherwise, firms face a lower marginal cost of labor. 
Profit-maximizing monopolistically competitive firms will then be willing to hire more 
workers and given a sufficient degree of profit sharing, an excess demand for labor 
results. As the marked up price is lower than in a wage economy, a resulting real 
balance effect leads to a higher aggregate demand and hence to a higher desired 
output.
2 
Weitzman’s propositions about the macroeconomic benefits of profit sharing 
were promptly criticized by economists of different persuasions,  and a common 
heterodox criticism is that Weitzman ignored effective demand issues and implicitly 
assumed that unemployment is caused by downward wage inflexibility (see e.g., 
Davidson, 1986-87; Rothschild, 1986-87). Although well taken, this criticism does 
                                                           
1 This revised version was produced while I was visiting the Economics Department of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. It has 
benefitted from useful comments by two anonymous referees and the guest editor of this 
special issue of Metroeconomica, Amitava Krishna Dutt, though any remaining errors are 
my own. Research funding received from the Brazilian Coordination for the Improvement 
of Higher Level Personnel (CAPES) and the Brazilian National Council of Scientific and 
Technological Development (CNPq) is likewise gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Profit-sharing arrangements vary considerably, and some major ways in which they differ 
concern what is actually shared (e.g., total profits or profits above a certain target), how 
and when compensation is made (e.g., in cash or company stocks, in a deferred or non-
deferred way) and to whom compensation is made (e.g., directly to workers or to some 
workers’ retirement plan). 1 
 
not imply that profit sharing per se should necessarily be dismissed, and this paper 
develops a short-run Neo-Kaleckian model of capacity utilization and growth, in 
which income distribution features profit sharing. As distribution plays a prominent 
role in the Kaleckian approach, it is only natural to investigate the potential benefits 
of profit sharing for macroeconomic performance in a model conforming to central 
tenets of that approach. 
The empirical literature on profit sharing finds that its adoption usually raises 
labor productivity.
3 Although the estimated size of the productivity gain varies from 
case to case, it is usually non-negligible. Meanwhile, the empirical evidence for the 
proposition that profit sharing leads to stronger employment performance is more 
mixed. Weitzman and Kruse (1990)  examine sixteen studies showing that profit 
sharing raises productivity and find that only 6 percent of the 218 estimated profit-
sharing coefficients are negative (and none significantly so), while 60 percent of 
them are significantly positive. Conyon and Freeman (2004), using UK data, find 
that firms that adopt profit-related pay tend to outperform other firms in productivity 
and financial performance, a resulted also obtained by Cahuc and Dormont (1997) 
using data for France.  Kim (1998), meanwhile, using US data, finds that  though 
profit sharing raises productivity, this does not translate into higher profits, as gains 
from profit sharing are cancelled out by increased labor costs . Nevertheless, D’Art 
and Turner (2004), using data for 11 European countries, find that the relationship 
between profit sharing and firms’ financial performance is statistically and strongly 
significant. Meanwhile Dube and Freeman (2008), using US data, find that profit 
sharing has a statistically significant effect on labor productivity when accompanied 
by shared modes of decision-making. 
As the empirical evidence reveals that profit sharing became more common 
but not universal, this paper extends a setup developed in Lima (2010) to consider 
that firms behave heterogeneously as regards the choice of workers’ compensation 
strategy. While some firms choose to compensate workers with only a base wage 
(non-sharing strategy), the remaining firms opt to offer profit sharing on top of such 
                                                           
3 Two reasons offered in the literature for the productivity-enhancing effect of profit sharing 
are its inducement of higher worker’s effort level and its reduction of labor turnover. 2 
 
a base wage (profit-sharing strategy).
4 In line with the empirical evidence, workers 
hired by profit-sharing firms have a higher productivity than their counterparts in 
base-wage firms.
5 An interesting question that arises (inter alia) is how does an 
exogenous change in the frequency distribution of compensation strategies in the 
population of firms affect average capacity utilization, employment and growth. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
structure of the model. Meanwhile, Section 3 solves for the short-run equilibrium 
values of average capacity utilization and growth, and then derives and discusses 
comparative-statics results. The closing section summarizes the main conclusions 
reached along the way. 
2. Structure of the model 
The economy is a closed one and with no government activities, producing a 
single good for both investment and consumption. Production is carried out by a 
population  of  h  imperfectly-competitive  firms,  which  combine  capital  and  labor 
through a fixed-coefficient technology. Firms produce (and hire labor) according to 
effective demand, which is assumed to be insufficient for any of them to produce at 
full capacity utilization at prevailing prices. Two technologies are available: though 
they have the same capital coefficient, one of them has a lower labor coefficient. 
The technological choice of a given firm is, however, conditioned by its choice of 
workers’ compensation strategy, of which there are two ( , i n s  ): a firm can either 
pay workers only a base wage (non-sharing strategy, n) or pay them a base wage 
and a share of profits (profit-sharing strategy,  s ). Firms playing the profit-sharing 
strategy  gain access  to  the  technology  with  the  lowest  labor  coefficient. As the 
base wage rate is the same under both strategies, any worker hired by a sharing 
firm receives a higher (average) total compensation than a worker hired by a non-
                                                           
4  This  paper  does  not set  forth  a formal  theory  explaining  why  firms  behaviorally  limit 
themselves  to  these  two  compensation  strategies  only;  arguably,  though,  the  analysis 
conducted here can be seen as necessary anyway as a preliminary step toward dealing 
with such a larger issue. 
5 In addition to this major structural difference given by the consideration of heterogeneous 
behavior by firms, the building blocks of the  present model also differ from those used in 
Lima (2010) by privileging a Neo-Kaleckian specification, given the theme of this special 
issue of this journal. In Lima (2010), for instance,  several different specifications of the 
investment and  consumption functions are considered ,  including one in which workers 
save some of the compensation they receive as shared profits. 3 
 
sharing firm along the economically meaningful domain given by strictly positive 
profits for any existing sharing firm. The inverse of the labor coefficient of the  j -th 
firm is given by: 
/ i j j a X L                [1] 
for all  1,2,..., i jh  , where  i a  denotes the labor productivity corresponding to each 
workers’ compensation strategy,  j X  is the individual output level and  j L  is the 
individual employment level. It then follows that  / s j j a X L   for all  1,2,..., s jh   and 
/ n j j a X L   for all  1,2,..., n jh  , with  sn aa  . 
We assume that firms that choose the same compensation strategy produce 
the same amount of output (and hence hire the same amount of workers) and also 
charge the same price. More precisely, if we let  i h  denote the number of firms that 
adopted compensation strategy  i and let  i X  denote the total amount of output 
produced by firms that adopted compensation strategy i , it follows that: 
/ j i i x X h                [2] 
for all  1,2,..., i jh  , where  i x  denotes the individual output corresponding to each 
workers’ compensation strategy. It then follows that  / j s s x X h   for all  1,2,..., s jh   
and  / j n n x X h   for all  1,2,..., n jh  . 
Having chosen a given compensation strategy, a firm makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to available workers to hire as many workers it needs to produce its 
demand-determined  level  of  output.  Nonetheless,  the  hired  workers  deliver  the 
labor effort ensuring that their productivity is equal to the expected one by firms 
when they decided what compensation strategy to offer. As a result, workers have 
a higher productivity if the hiring firm pay they them a base wage and a share of 
profits, which is the entire surplus over the corresponding base wage. 
The  aggregate  capital  stock,  K ,  is  assumed  to  be  uniformly  distributed 
across firms. Denoting by  s K  and  n K  the amounts of capital operated by sharing 
and non-sharing firms, respectively, it follows that  / / / s s n n K h K h K h . The rate 
of capacity utilization of each subpopulation of firms is then given by: 4 
 
/ s s s u X K                [3] 
and 
/ n n n u X K                [4] 
Therefore, average capacity utilization,  / u X K  , is given by: 
(1 ) s n s s n n
sn
sn
X X K X K X X
u u u
K K K K K K


           [5] 
where   is the proportion of firms adopting the sharing strategy, ( / ) ( / ) ss h h K K  , 
and  hence  (1 )     is  the  proportion  of  firms  adopting  the  non-sharing  strategy, 
( / ) ( / ) nn h h K K  . As the capital stock is uniformly distributed across firms,   also 
denotes the proportion of the capital stock operated by firms adopting the sharing 
strategy and hence (1 )    also denotes the proportion of the capital stock operated 
by firms adopting the non-sharing strategy. 







               [6] 
where  1 i z   is the markup factor (one plus the markup) applied by firms adopting 
compensation  strategy  i,  while  w  is  the  (uniform)  nominal  base  wage.  As  we 
assume  that  the  productivity  differential between  the  two  strategies  is given  by 
/1 sn aa   , and for simplicity we further assume that  1 n a  , so that  s a   , the 






               [7] 
and 
nn P z w                [8] 
Having chosen to follow a profit-sharing strategy, a firm has to further decide 
how it will use the resulting productivity differential. We assume that a sharing firm 
uses its productivity differential to apply a markup factor which is proportionately 
higher  than  that  applied  by  non-sharing  firms,  /1 sn zz   ,  while  charging  the 5 
 
same price,  sn PP   (and hence without compromising its ability to sell as much 
output as non-sharing firms, as detailed later).
6 
We compute the average price level as the following weighted average: 
1
sn P P P                  [9] 
Yet since all firms charge the same price the average price level is given by: 
sn P P P               [10] 
The nominal profits of the subpopulation of sharing firms are given by: 
s s s s P X wL                [11] 
As the average price level is given by [10], the real profits of the subpopulation of 
sharing firms are given by: 
1 (1 ) s
s s s s R X vL v X
P
 
             [12] 
where v is the real base wage. Meanwhile, the nominal profits of the subpopulation 
of non-sharing firms are given by: 
n n n n P X wL                [13] 
The real profits of the subpopulation of non-sharing firms are then given by: 
(1 ) n
n n n n R X vL v X
P

             [14] 
Normalizing the real profits of the two subpopulations of firms by the capital stock, 
we have: 
1 1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) s s s s
s
s
R X K X
v v v u
K K K K
                 [15] 
and 
                                                           
6 Another alternative would be for a sharing firm to charge a price proportionately lower 
than  that charged  by  non-sharing firms,  while  applying  the  same markup.  Yet  another 
possibility would be for a sharing firm to use the productivity differential to both raise its 
markup and improve its price competitiveness, though less than proportionately in either 
case. Also, we could assume that not all sharing firms make the same decision about how 
to use the productivity differential, but we assume that they behave alike in that respect. To 
keep focus, we leave for future work the exploration of these alternative specifications. 6 
 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) n n n n
n
n
R X K X
v v v u
K K K K
              [16] 
Denoting by  1 (1 ) s v     the proportion of (gross) profits in the output of sharing 
firms (as explained later, it is gross profits since a fraction of them is shared with 
workers) and by  (1 ) n v   the proportion of profits in the output of non-sharing 













              [16’] 
As a result, it follows that  1 / (1 )/(1 ) 1 sn vv        . Intuitively, the productivity 
differential  implies  a  profit  share  differential  if  sharing  firms  use  it  to  raise their 
markup  proportionately,  while  charging  the  same  price  as  non-sharing  firms. 
Meanwhile, the average general rate of profit,  / RK , is given by: 
(1 ) (1 ) s s n n s n
R
r u u r r
K
                  [17] 
where  s r  is the (gross) profit rate of sharing firms and  n r  is the profit rate of non-
sharing firms. 
The economy is inhabited by two classes, capitalists who own the firms and 
workers. Workers, who are always in excess supply, provide labor and earn a base 
wage, if they work for non-sharing firms, while workers hired by sharing firms also 
receive a share of profits. In terms of the alternative sharing schema described in 
footnote 1, we assume that what it is shared is total profits and that compensation 
is made in cash, in a non-deferred way and directly to workers. We also assume 
that while workers’ total compensation is all spent on consumption, capitalists save 
a fraction of their respective profit income. 
The division of real income from production by sharing firms is given by: 
(1 ) s s s s X vL R R                [18] 7 
 
where  01     is  the  profit-sharing  coefficient.  Workers’  total  compensation  in 
income from production by sharing firms,  s  , can be expressed as: 







     
            [19] 
Hence sharing capitalists’ compensation as a proportion of the income from their 
own production is given by: 
1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) c
ss v                   [20] 
where  1 1 s v    ,  as defined above,  is the proportion  of  (gross) profits  in  the 
output of sharing firms. Meanwhile, division of the income from production by non-
sharing firms is given by: 
n n n X vL R              [21] 
Workers’ compensation in income from production by non-sharing firms,  n  , can 







               [22] 
Hence non-sharing capitalists’ compensation as a proportion of the income from 
their own production, as defined above, is given by: 
1 n v                [23] 
As a result, workers’ total compensation as a proportion of aggregate income,  , 
which is equivalent to the average workers’ share in income, can be expressed as: 
()
[ (1 ) ]/ s n s
s s n n




   

        [24] 
Meanwhile, capitalists’ total compensation as a fraction of aggregate income,   , 
which is equivalent to the average capitalists’ share in income, is given by: 
(1 )
[ (1 ) ]/ c sn





   

        [25] 
Yet we assumed that the productivity differential granted by adopting profit 
sharing is used by sharing firms to raise their markup factor. This is tantamount to 8 
 
assuming that the distribution of aggregate effective demand across strategies is 
governed by the following rule: 
// s n n s u u P P              [26] 
We are assuming that individual nominal demand (or individual nominal revenue) 
( / i i i PX h ),  which  is  the  same  for  all  firms  adopting  a  given  strategy,  is  also 
equalized across strategies ( // s s s n n n P X h P X h  ). We can use [5], [10] and [26] to 
re-write [24] and [25] as follows: 
(1 ) sn                    [24’] 
and 
(1 ) c
sn                    [25’] 
Recall that workers’ total compensation is all spent on consumption, while 
capitalists save a common fraction, 01 s , of their (net) profit income. Aggregate 
saving, S , is then given by: 
  (1 ) sn S s R R                [27] 
Substituting  from  [15]  and  [16]  and  recalling  that  [5],  [10]  and  [26]  imply  that 
sn u u u  , aggregate saving as a proportion of the capital stock,  s g , and hence 
average saving, can be expressed as: 
1 [ (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )] s g s v v u                    [28] 
We assume that firms behave similarly as regards desired investment, with 
firms  playing  the  same  compensation  strategy  behaving  alike  (so  that  / d
ss Ih   is 
equal  for  all  1,2,..., s jh    and  / d
nn Ih   is  equal for  all  1,2,..., n jh  ).  Total  desired 
investment  by  firms  playing  each  compensation  strategy, 
d
s I   and 
d
n I ,  as  a 
proportion of the aggregate capital stock, 
d
s g  and 
d


























             [30] 
where  0  ,  1   and  2   are positive parameters. As it turns out, aggregate desired 
investment as a proportion of the aggregate capital stock, 
d g , which is equal to the 
average desired capital accumulation, is given by: 
0 1 2
(1 ) d d d s n s n
sn





                   
      [31] 
Substituting from [5], [15], [16] and (along with  sn PP  ) [26], we obtain the following 
expression for the average desired rate of capital accumulation: 
1
0 1 2 { [ (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )] } d g v v u                       [32] 
We  follow  Rowthorn  (1981)  and  Dutt  (1984),  who  in  turn  follow  Kalecki 
(1971) and Robinson (1962), in taking (average) the desired capital accumulation 
rate to depend positively on the (average) current profit rate. The rationale is that 
the (average) current profit rate is an index of (average) expected future earnings 
and also both provides internal funding for investment and makes it easier for firms 
to obtain external funding. As in this model a fraction of aggregate profit income 
goes to workers as shared profits, though, it is more reasonable to make (average) 
desired capital accumulation to depend on the component of the (average) general 
rate of profit (given by [17]) corresponding to profits remaining with capitalists (note 
that the net rate of profit of sharing firms is given by  (1 ) c
ss rr   ). We also follow 
Rowthorn  (1981)  and  Dutt  (1984),  who  in  turn  now  follow  Steindl  (1952),  in 
assuming that (average) desired capital accumulation depends positively on the 
(average) rate of capacity utilization due to accelerator-type effects.
7 
3. Behavior of the model in the short run 
We define the short run as a time frame in which the capital stock,  K , the 
labor supply,  N, the output-labor ratios,  s a  and  n a , the markup factors,  s z  and  n z , 
                                                           
7 Alternatively, following Kalecki (1935) and Robinson (1962), we could assume that it is 
the expected profit rate that matters for desired investment, so that [29]-[31] would feature 
the expected capitalists’ rates of profit instead. Hence the specification in [29]-[31] can be 
seen as making the implicit assumption (often made by Kalecki and Robinson themselves) 
of static profit expectations, with expected values proxied by current ones. 10 
 
the nominal base wage, w (and consequently the price level, P ), the profit-sharing 
coefficient,  , and the distribution of compensation strategies across firms,  , can 
all be taken as given (recall that the population of firms, h, is fixed). The existence 
of excess (aggregate and individual) capital capacity implies that (aggregate and 
subpopulational) output ( X , s X  and  n X ) will adjust to remove any excess demand 
or supply in the economy, so that in short-run equilibrium, aggregate saving,  S , is 
equal to aggregate desired investment,  I . As a proportion of the capital stock, this 




               [33] 
We can solve for the short-run equilibrium value of average capacity utilization by 
substituting [28] and [32] in [33], which yields: 
* 0
1




       
      
      [34] 
Given the demand-driven nature of this model, we assume an adjustment 
mechanism stating that average capacity utilization varies positively with average 
excess demand in the goods market. This means that u
* will be positive and stable 
provided that  average  saving is more responsive than  average  desired  capital 
accumulation to changes in average capacity utilization, which in turn requires that 
the denominator of  u
* is positive. Note that the pricing equations [7] and [8] imply 
meaningful values for the subpopulational profit shares given by  0 / 1 i i i RX     , 
which according to the derivation leading to [15’] and [16’] requires that  01 v  , 
while we assumed that  1   ,  01    and  01   . Hence  1 s    is a necessary 
condition for the equilibrium value of the short-run average capacity utilization to be 
positive and stable, and we will see below that it also plays a significant role in the 
derivation of several comparative-statics results. 
Indeed, a first issue worth addressing is the impact of changes in the real 
base wage on average capacity utilization, which is given by: 









     
    
         [35] 11 
 
where  D is the denominator in the expression in [34]. Hence a rise in the real base 
wage, which translates into a rise in the share of workers’ total compensation in 
income (as shown by [24’] in conjunction with [19] and [22]), leads to an increase in 
average capacity utilization. As in the canonical Neo-Kaleckian model developed 
independently by Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984) (which does not feature profit 
sharing), a rise in the real base wage, by redistributing income from capitalists who 
save to workers who do not, makes for a rise in (average) consumption demand, 
raises  (average)  investment  demand  through  the  accelerator  effect,  and  hence 
boosts  the  (average)  level  of  economic  activity.  Furthermore,  as  the  size  and 
distribution of the capital stock across compensation strategies and the average 
labor productivity are both given, such a rise in average capacity utilization (and 
therefore  in  average  and  aggregate  output)  is  accompanied  by  an  increase  in 
aggregate employment (and hence, as the aggregate labor supply is given, in the 
rate of employment as well). We can use [1], [3]-[4] and [34] to express the short-
run equilibrium level of aggregate employment, 
* L , as: 
*





             [36] 
where a is the average labor productivity. This expansionary effect of a higher real 
base wage contrasts with Weitzman’s (1984, 1985) main proposition that a fall in 
the marginal cost of labor (which is claimed to be effectively brought about by the 
introduction of a profit-sharing mechanism) is a precondition for a rise in output and 
employment.  In  Weitzman’s  approach  a  fall  in  the  marginal  cost  of  labor  is  a 
necessary condition for firms to hire more workers and for a fall in the price level to 
generate the real balance effects through which aggregate demand will increase to 
allow firms to sell their increased output. In the model developed here, meanwhile, 
an independent and heterogeneous investment behavior figures prominently in the 
determination of aggregate demand. Although investment behavior is independent 
from savings, it is nonetheless dependent on the distribution of income not only 
between capitalists and workers, but between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing 
capitalists as well.
8 
                                                           
8 The wage-led expansion derived above replicates the main result of the canonical Neo-
Kaleckian model, and hence does not come from the introduction of profit sharing per se 
(though a rise in the real (base) wage now exerts both a positive and a negative impact on 12 
 
Meanwhile, a rise in the real base wage will likewise lead to an increase in 
the short-run equilibrium average growth rate, 
* g , as shown by substituting [34] in 





[ (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )]




    
     


    

      










           
       [38] 
where  D is again the denominator in the expression in [34]. As a result, the sign of 
*
v g  is the same as the sign of the first term in brackets in its numerator, which can 
be checked to be positive. Note that the term in question indicates the difference 
between the equilibrium average growth rate, 
* g , and the (exogenous) average 
growth rate which would obtain if average desired accumulation (given by [32]) did 
not include an accelerator effect (i.e. if  2 0   ). And, as [34] and [37] clearly shows, 
equilibrium average capacity utilization and growth are both higher in the presence 
of the accelerator effect given by  2 0    than otherwise.
9 
Other comparative-statics results follow from the demand -led nature of the 
model. Equilibrium average capacity utilization  (and hence equilibrium aggregate 
output and employment) and growth vary negatively with the average propensity to 
save,  s, and positively with the parameters of the average desired accumulation 
function ( 0  ,  1   and  2  ). Equilibrium average capacity utilization and growth also 
vary negatively with the productivity differential,  . The intuition is clear: a higher 
   raises  the  average  markup  and  hence  lowers  the  share  of  workers’  total 
compensation  in  income,  which  then  reduces  average  effective  demand.  As  a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
workers’  total  compensation  as  a  fraction  of  income,  given  that  the  shared-profits 
component of workers’ total compensation falls). Yet other comparative statics explored 
below will show that profit sharing creates further channels through which the share of 
workers’ total compensation in income (and hence aggregate demand and the level of 
economic activity) may change. 
9 Although it is also the case that the conditions for positivity and stability of  * u  and  * g  are 
more  stringent  when  average  capacity  utilization  is  a further  separate  argument  in  the 
average desired accumulation function, as can be easily checked. 13 
 
result, a higher productivity differential makes for a fall in aggregate employment 
not only by raising average productivity (see [36]), but also by reducing aggregate 
output. 
The impact of changes in the profit-sharing coefficient,  , on the equilibrium 



















      
       [40] 
where  D is as before. As in the expression in [38], the sign of 
* g  is the same as 
the sign of the first term in brackets in its numerator, which  is positive. As a result, 
a rise in the profit-sharing coefficient, which translates into a rise in the share of 
workers’ total compensation in income and consequently raises average effective 
demand, makes for a rise in average capacity utilization (and hence in aggregate 
output and employment) and growth. 
Finally, it is worth exploring the effect of changes in the frequency of sharing 
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      [42] 
where  D is as before. As it turns out, average capacity utilization and growth vary 
positively with the frequency of profit-sharing firms if the (common) term in the first 
set of brackets in the numerator in [41]-[42] is positive. Recall from [12] and [14], 
respectively, that 
1 (1 )(1 ) v 
   measures sharing capitalists’ (net) participation in 
the income resulting from their own production, while (1 ) v   measures non-sharing 
capitalists’ participation in the income  resulting from their own production.  As a 14 
 
result, a rise in the frequency distribution of sharing firms leads to a rise in average 
capacity utilization and growth if it results in a reduction in the share of capitalists’ 
total compensation in aggregate income. We can solve for the level of the profit-
sharing coefficient, say  , at which, given the productivity differential and the real 
base wage, the fraction of capitalists’ total compensation in aggregate income is 
invariant to changes in the frequency of sharing firms, so that 















          [43] 
As  1    and we assumed that  1 v   to ensure economically meaningful values of 
different measures of income distribution, it follows that  01   . Hence a rise in 
the frequency of sharing firms leads to a rise (fall) in average capacity utilization 
and growth if     (  ). Intuitively, as the productivity differential is used by 
sharing firms to raise their markup, for a rise in the frequency of sharing firms to 
result in higher average capacity utilization and growth it has to lead to a rise in 
average effective demand and hence in workers’ total compensation in aggregate 
income, which in turn requires that  the profit-sharing coefficient is high enough. 
Note that   rises with both the real base wage and the productivity differential, as 
[24’] shows that the magnitude of the effect of a change in the frequency of sharing 
firms on workers’ total compensation as a proportion of aggregate income varies 
negatively with the real base wage and the productivity differential. 
  The  impact  of a  change  in  the frequency  distribution  of  sharing  firms  on 
equilibrium aggregate employment is more complex, as average capacity utilization 
and average productivity vary in response to it. Now, since average productivity 
varies positively with the frequency of sharing firms, a rise in the latter leading to a 
fall in average capacity utilization makes for a fall in equilibrium employment. Yet a 
rise in the frequency of sharing firms leading to an increase in average capacity 
utilization yields an ambiguous net outcome (recall from the Introduction that the 
empirical  evidence  for  the  employment-enhancing  properties  of  profit  sharing  is 










           [44] 15 
 
Therefore, 
* 0 L   as 
** /1 au u a   . Hence a rise in the frequency of sharing firms 
will increase, have no effect or decrease equilibrium aggregate employment as the 
elasticity  of  average  capacity  utilization  with  respect  to  average  productivity  is 
greater than, equal to or less than one.
10 
  Consequently, the incorporation of  profit sharing creates  further channels 
through  which  the  share  of  workers’  total  compensation  in  income  (and  hence 
aggregate effective demand) may change. And, as effective demand depends on 
distribution  both  in  the  interclass  (capitalists  and  workers)  dimension  and  in  an 
intraclass  (profit-sharing  and  non-profit-sharing  capitalists)  dimension,  profit 
sharing does not necessarily improve macroeconomic performance. Although one 
should be careful in drawing parallels between Weitzman’s (1984, 1985) approach 
and the one developed here (as they are based on different assumptions), note 
that  Weitzman’s  proposition  that  widespread  adoption  of  profit  sharing  has 
significant macroeconomic benefits has not been unambiguously confirmed. 
  Although this paper focuses on the short run, some remarks on dynamics 
are worth making. Note that the short-run equilibrium solution is characterized by a 
profitability differential unless the profit-sharing coefficient happens to be exactly 
equal to   . In fact,     yields not only a profit share differential, but also (as 
* * *
sn u u u ) a profit rate differential, as  cc
s s s ru    differs from  n n n ru   . As a result, 
some variable may change over time in response to such a profitability differential. 
For instance, and abstracting from any structural change to confine attention to 
components of the profit share differential, the profit-sharing coefficient may be the 
corresponding adjusting variable. However, while 
c
sn    may conceivably put a 
downward pressure on  , this adjustment dynamics would likely be asymmetrical, 
with  c
sn    not inducing sharing firms to raise  . Another alternative would be for 
the real base wage to be the adjusting variable. Although we have assumed that 
the nominal base wage is uniform across firms,  c
sn    may lead sharing firms to 
revise their nominal base wage downwards. However, this adjustment dynamics 
                                                           
10  The  condition for 
* 0 L    reduces  to  12 ( )( ) ( 1) 0
c
ns s           ,  which can  be 
satisfied without necessarily violating any of the parametric restrictions assumed earlier. 16 
 
would likely be asymmetrical as well, as it is not clear why  c
sn    should induce 
sharing firms to raise their nominal base wage (though a symmetrically equalizing 
mechanism may operate in this case if non-sharing firms were led to reduce their 
nominal base wage).
11 Besides, workers may well succeed in resisting reductions 
in the nominal base wage (even if only to some extent ) and the dynamics of the 
real base wage would nonetheless  also depend on the  behavior of the average 
price level (although profit sharing may conceivably have noninflationary properties 
if inflation results from conflicting-claims on income). Yet another alternative would 
be for the frequency of sharing firms to vary with any profitability differential, which 
would raise the  interesting question (among others)  of whether  heterogeneity as 
regards workers’ compensation mechanism would persist over time. In either of 
these alternative adjustment dynamics, however, the analysis would be made more 
complex (even if more interesting) by the fact that, as capital accumulation differs 
across compensation strategies (see [29]-[30]), the distribution of the capital stock 
across firms would change over time. 
4. Summary 
This paper has set forth a simple Neo-Kaleckian short-run model of capacity 
utilization and growth with distribution featuring profit sharing. As profit sharing has 
become more common but not universal, firms behave heterogeneously as regards 
workers’ compensation strategy: a given firm compensates workers with either only 
a base wage or a profit-sharing amount on top of the same base wage. As in the 
                                                           
11 Although we assumed that the nominal wage is uniform, all but one of the qualitative 
results derived in this section would still obtain if the model were re-specified as follows 
(which indeed would make it closer to Weitzman’s). Suppose that firms operate with the 
highest labor productivity (normalized to one) available by either paying a higher nominal 
wage  or  also  sharing  profits. If  /1 ns ww   ,  sharing  firms  can set  a  proportionately 
higher markup than non-sharing firms but charge the same price (so  / ns vv   ). If we 
substituted  n v  for  v, [15]-[25] could still be used as distributive accounting. A rise in   
would lower 
* u , 
* g  and 
* L , but now, given  n v , by reducing  s v  and hence   (a rise in  s v , 
given  n v , which implies a fall in  , would then raise 
* u , 
* g  and 
* L ). Meanwhile, a rise in 
n v , given  , would raise 
* u , 
* g  and 
* L  by raising   directly and indirectly (as  s v  also 
rises). A rise in   would raise 
* u , 
* g  and 
* L , and a rise in    would do so if 
c
ns   . 
Hence only the sign of 
* L  would be affected to become unambiguously positive, given that 
average labor productivity would be constant at unity. 17 
 
canonical Neo-Kaleckian model (which does not feature profit sharing), average 
capacity utilization and growth (and aggregate employment) vary positively with the 
real base wage. Meanwhile, average capacity utilization and growth (and overall 
employment) vary negatively with the productivity differential and positively with the 
profit-sharing coefficient. While a higher profit-sharing coefficient is expansionary 
irrespective of the distribution of compensation strategies across firms, a higher 
frequency of profit-sharing firms raises average capacity utilization and growth (and 
overall employment) only if the profit-sharing coefficient is sufficiently high. 
As a comparative static framework was utilized all along, a natural line of 
extension would be to incorporate dynamic forces, thus addressing relevant issues 
from which this paper has abstracted. In fact, only by fluke the short-run equilibrium 
will not be characterized by a profitability differential which would in turn give rise to 
several possible adjustment dynamics. For instance, the profit-sharing coefficient 
and/or the frequency of profit-sharing firms (or even the sharing arrangement itself) 
is liable to change endogenously. Another issue I leave for research in progress 
(for which the reader is invited to stay tuned) is the effect of profit sharing and other 
alternative employee compensation mechanisms on conflicting-claims inflation. 
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